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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
18-2548 
________________ 
 
ROD SLAPPY-SUTTON, JEAN SUTTON, H/W, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
SPEEDWAY LLC 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. 2:16-cv-04765) 
Honorable Jan E. DuBois, U.S. District Judge 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 22, 2019 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: March 25, 2019) 
 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Rod Slappy-Sutton and Jean Sutton challenge the District 
Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Speedway LLC.  
Because we find there are genuine disputes of material fact, we will reverse. 
I. Background 
On a winter evening in January 2016, after refueling his vehicle, Slappy-Sutton 
went inside a Speedway convenience store to purchase snacks.  After exiting the store, he 
crossed the sidewalk, but when he reached the end of the sidewalk, he failed to perceive 
the drop down to the ground below.  As a result, he stepped forward with the expectation 
that his foot would encounter more sidewalk, but his foot instead traveled six inches 
down, and he fell.  According to Slappy-Sutton, the end of the sidewalk was 
imperceptible due to a one-foot-wide concrete apron that was nearly identical in color to 
and abutted the sidewalk.  That concrete apron was added by Speedway in 2015 to fill a 
trench, which was dug as part of an upgrade to the underground gas tank monitoring 
system.  Prior to the addition of the concrete apron, the asphalt that covers the rest of the 
lot came all the way up to the sidewalk. 
Because of his slip, Slappy-Sutton suffered physical, economic, and emotional 
damages.  He, along with his wife, sued Speedway in state court for negligence and loss 
of consortium.  Speedway removed the suit to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
Following discovery, the District Court granted Speedway’s motion for summary 
judgment, finding that the similarity in color between the sidewalk and concrete apron 
did not create a dangerous condition, and that, if it did create a dangerous condition, it 
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was open and obvious, such that Speedway was not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries.  This 
timely appeal followed. 
II. Discussion1 
On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court erred by entering summary 
judgment because genuine disputes of material fact exist as to whether the sidewalk was a 
dangerous condition, and, if it was, whether it was open and obvious.  We review the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 
808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015).  To prevail at this stage, the moving party must 
establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A factual dispute is 
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
Under Pennsylvania law, “[p]ossessors of land owe a duty to protect invitees from 
foreseeable harm.”  Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983).  When an 
invitee suffers injuries due to a condition on a possessor’s land, the possessor is liable for 
those injuries only if she: (1) knew of “or by the exercise of reasonable care would [have 
discovered] the condition” and  “realize[d] that it involve[d] an unreasonable risk of 
harm” to the invitee; (2) should have expected that the invitee would “not discover or 
realize the danger, or [would] fail to protect [himself] against it”; and (3) “fail[ed] to 
exercise reasonable care to protect [the invitee] against the danger.”  Id. (quoting 
                                              
1 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343).  Under this framework, if the condition causing 
the injury was “known or obvious” to the invitee, the possessor is not liable for the 
injuries caused unless she “should [have] anticipate[d] the harm despite such knowledge 
or obviousness.”  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A). 
“[T]he question of what is a dangerous condition is one of fact which must be 
answered by the jury.”  Finn v. City of Philadelphia., 664 A.2d 1342, 1345 (Pa. 1995) 
(citing Bendas v. Twp. of White Deer, 611 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Pa. 1992)).  Similarly, “the 
question of whether a danger was known or obvious is usually a question of fact for the 
jury.”  Carrender, 469 A.2d at 124.  However, “the[se] question[s] may be decided by the 
court where reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion.”  Id; see Bendas, 611 
A.2d at 1187 n.6. 
Here, the parties are largely in agreement about the physical condition of the 
sidewalk and the basic facts surrounding Slappy-Sutton’s fall.  They disagree, however, 
about whether the sidewalk rose to the level of a dangerous condition, and, if so, whether 
that condition was open and obvious.  The District Court found, and Speedway argues on 
appeal, that the sidewalk was one that “an invitee should normally expect to encounter,” 
and that because Slappy-Sutton was able to ascend to the sidewalk safely, the sidewalk’s 
condition was open and obvious.  Appellee Br. 33 (quoting App. 8).  
But our review of the record suggests these facts are in genuine dispute because 
Slappy-Sutton raised sufficient evidence before the District Court from which a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict in Plaintiffs’ favor.  For example, Slappy-Sutton 
testified that, in his experience, a sidewalk’s end is usually perceptible because it either 
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clearly contrasts with the pavement below or is marked with paint, and that he had “never 
seen” a sidewalk like Speedway’s.  App. 120.  He also testified repeatedly that the 
sidewalk’s similarity in color to the concrete apron was the reason he perceived the 
sidewalk as wider than it actually was.  And should the case proceed to trial, Slappy-
Sutton is prepared to introduce expert testimony to support his contention that the 
sidewalk’s condition was dangerous. 
Furthermore, Slappy-Sutton’s account is consistent with non-testimonial evidence, 
such as the surveillance camera footage, which captured the fall, and photographic 
evidence showing that the appearance of the sidewalk’s edge varies with the angle from 
which it is viewed, the ambient lighting conditions, and the direction of travel, i.e., 
whether the viewer is entering or exiting the store.  On this evidence, both the question of 
whether the sidewalk’s condition was dangerous and whether that condition was open 
and obvious remain unresolved.  Reasonable minds could differ, and as a result, these are 
“question[s] of fact for the jury.”  Carrender, 469 A.2d at 124. 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Speedway and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
